STATE TAXATION: TENNESSEE LIMITS CHARITABLE
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION
TRADmONALLY, religious, charitable and educational institutions
have received significant state tax exemptions. The courts, favorably
inclined toward such institutions, have utilized liberal tests and
distinctions in order to broaden the scope of these exemptions.
Despite this modern trend toward generous tax treatment of charities, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Nashville v. State Bd. of
Equalization1 significantly narrowed the scope of Tennessee's exemption statute, after re-examining state exemption policies in the
light of present municipal needs, and rejecting previously acceptable
judicial distinctions.
The City of Nashville sought to apply its ad valorem property
tax to employee cafeteria, snack bar and parking facilities maintained
by a religious publications affiliate of the Baptist Church. The State
Board of Equalization found that any secular use of the property
beneficial to the employees was merely incidental to its primary use
for religious purposes, and therefore, the Tennessee statutory requirement 2 that exempt property be exclusively used for purposes
enumerated in its charter was satisfied. The Tennessee Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that the present statute did not recognize any such two-purpose use but limited exemption to property exclusively, directly, and solely used for the organization's charter
purposes. Concluding that the employee eating and parking facilities were not directly used for religious purposes, the court asserted
that the most recent version of the Tennessee exemption statute
reflected a legislative policy of tightening charitable exemptions, 3 and
therefore the line of Tennessee cases decided under former statutes
which indicated that the exemption was valid was inapplicable.4
'360 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. 1962).
' TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502(2) (1955).

3 The court was impressed by the fact that the 1907 statute, which required exclusive
use and ownership only, was expressly repealed by the 1935 statute which required
ownership, exclusive use and occupation. The court felt that such an express repeal
was an expression of a legislative intent to abandon the liberal interpretation applied
to the 1907 statute. 360 S.W.2d at 465.
'E.g., Vanderbilt Univ. v. Cheney, 116 Tenn. 259, 94 S.W. 90 (1905) (university
owned apartments rented to tenants unconnected with the school); M.E. Church, South
v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188, 21 S.W. 321 (1893) (church publishing house competing with
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'Moreover, the established distinction between primary and incidental use was discarded in favor of a new standard which seems
to limit the availability of charitable exemptions in Tennessee.
Because charitable institutions are often property rich, their
exemption from ad valorem property taxation is most important and
presents pressing problems." The major problem stems from state
legislatures' persistent liberalization of these charitable exemptions
despite municipalities' increased dependence upon the broad tax
base brought on by their assumptions of a wider spectrum of
services. 7 While this liberalization results in part from pressures
by charitable organizations, it also emanates from the state legislatures' abandonment of property taxation as a source of state
revenue8 and its use of exemptions as a means of imposing state
policies on charitable organizations. 9 Even where legislatures have
drawn strict exemption statutes, another liberalizing factor has arisen
through the development of judicial tests and distinctions which
compromise the strictest statutes. 10 Often these distinctions are
secular businesses); State v. Fisk Univ., 87 Tenn. 233, 10 S.W. 284 (1889) (lot used to
raise vegetables for school cafeteria).
"[The act] . . . exempts only property 'occupied' and 'used exclusively' by the
institution for a purpose within its charter-'propertyphysically used in the work of the
institution'; .. . the Act refers to the direct and immediate use of the property itself
and not to any indirect and consequential benefit to be derived from its use." 360
S.W.2d at 468. (Emphasis in original.)
6 Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 288 (1950). See generally Aull, The Situation and
Outlook For Property Taxation In the South, 12 NAT'L TAX J. 86 (1959); Holbrook &
O'Neill, California Property Tax Trends: 1850-1950, 24 So. CAL. L. REv. 252 (1951).
7See Cheng & Edwards, Compensatory Property Taxation: An Alternative, 12
NAT'L TAx J. 270 (1959). As an example, in the state of North Carolina, 90.2% of
local taxes during the fiscal year 1959-60 came from the property tax. 1959-60 BIENNIAL
REP. oF N.C. Da, r. OF TAX RESEARCH 297.
8 See Newcomer, The Decline of the General Property Tax, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 38, 39
(1953).

' See, e.g., N.Y. TAx LAw § 4 (6) which states: "No educational corporation or association that holds itself out to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from taxation
pursuant to the provisions of this section shall deny the use of its facilities to any
person otherwise qualified, by reason of his race, color or religion."
10 See, e.g., Church Divinity School v. County of Alameda, 152 Cal. App. 2d 496, 314
P.2d 209 (1957) (student parking lots and faculty residences held incidental and reasonably necessary for school purposes); Bishop v. Treasurer of Arapahoe County, 29 Colo.
143, 68 Pac. 272. (1901) (instructor residing in school building-proper and appropriate
to charitable purpose); Sunset Memorial Park Ass'n v. Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 358, 182
N.E.2d 318 (1962) (flower shop held incidental to cemetery purposes); Pittsburgh Bible
Institute v. Board of Property Assessment, 405 Pa. 297, 175 A.2d 82 (1961) (farm
and timber lands integral part of charitable purpose).
Strictness is usually implemented by requiring exclusive use and/or that the property not be used for profit. However, exclusive-use-for-charter-purpose statutes have
been "an undisguised invitation to judicial legislation" because it has been difficult to
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foisted upon legislatures and incorporated into later statutes. Added
to these factors, there is a paucity of cases testing the exemptions,
a result that is either due to a prevailing practice among tax officials
not to tax such property, or perhaps to an opinion among these
officials that such property is not taxable, since it is generally accepted
as being exempt."'
State exemption statutes generally fall into three broad categories: those requiring ownership by an exempt organization (ownership statutes); those which disregard title and require only that
property be used for exempt purposes (use statutes); and finally,
those which require both ownership by an exempt organization and
use for exempt purposes (ownership-use statutes). 2 Those statutes
requiring use or ownership-use often specify, as does the Tennessee
statute,' 3 that the property must be exclusively used for exempt
purposes. Despite the generally accepted rule requiring that exemption statutes be strictly construed against exemption,1 4 the courts
in their construction and application have expanded the scope
of all three types of statutes.1 5 For example, courts applying use
interpret the line betweeri secular and charitable purposes. Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 Onio. ST. L.J. 461, 499-500 (1959).
2"Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1106, 1107 n.6 (1961). See generally, Van Alstyne, supra
note 10, at 476.
"2E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §8103 (1953) (ownership statute) applied in St.
Stanislaus Kostka Church v. Mayor of Wilmington, 48 Del. 411, 105 A.2d 596 (1954),
aff'd, 49 Del. 15, 108 A.2d 581 (1954); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
2d 250, 177 N.E.2d 854
1961) (use statute) applied in First Nat'l Bank v. Ryan, 23 Ill.
(1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-296 (Supp. 1961) (ownership-use statute) applied in
Southeastern Seminary, Inc. v. Wake County, 251 N.C. 775, 112 S.E.2d 528 (1960).
See Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1222, 1226-27 (1947); see generally Van Alstyne, supra note
10, at 464.
13 "The real estate owned by any . . . charitable ..

institution occupied by such

institution or its officers exclusively for carrying out there upon one or mor6 of the
purposes for which said institution was created [shall be exempted] ...." TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-502 (2) (1955).
11E.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209. 172 A.2d 420
(1961); Cleveland Osteopathic Hosp. v. Zangerle, 153 Ohio St. 222, 91 N.E.2d 261
(1950).

See 3 SUTHERIJLND, STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION

§ 6409

(3d ed., Horack 1943,

Supp. 1962); Note, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 968, 974 (1949).
"I See, e.g., State v. Second Church of Christ Scientist, 185 Minn. 242, 240 N.W.
532 (1932) (ownership statute); Pace College v. Boyland, 4 N.Y.S.2d 528, 151 N.E.2d
900 (1958) (ownership-use statute); Goldman v. Friars Club, 158 Ohio St. 185, 170
N.E.2d 518 (1952) (use statute).
As an example of such liberalization under an ownership-use statute, see County
of Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 125 S.E.2d 812 (Va. 1962). See
also YMCA v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 760, 767, 221 P.2d 47, 51 (1950) where
the court held that "the rule of strict construction generally applicable to tax exemption laws must prevail here, but adherence to such legal principle does not require that
the narrowest possible meaning be given to the exempting language if it would
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and ownership-use statutes have sustained liberality by invoking the
primary-incidental distinction 6 and allowing exemption if the
non-charter use is secondary to a charter use, or by applying a test
of what is reasonable and necessary for the use and occupation of
the premises for charter purposes.1
Further liberalization has been accomplished in a minority of
states by applying a rule that exemptions are to be liberally construed.18 This expansion has also been extended to the majority
rule states requiring strict construction against exemption by taking
cognizance of the rule that revenue acts are to be strictly construed
against the taxing authority. 9 Thus the taxpayer's burden of
proving exemption is easily maintained.2 0 Moreover, even where
exemption has ben denied, the courts have honored established
establish too severe a standard and defeat the apparent objective of the law. Rather
the construction of the law, though strict, must also be reasonable."
28 See, e.g., Shaarai Berocho v. City of New York, 61 N.Y. Super. 163, 18 N.Y.S. 792
(1892) (church property used for caretaker's quarters held incidental to worship);
Sunset Memorial Park Ass'n v. Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 358, 182 N.E.2d 318 (1962) (flower
shop held incidental to cemetery operation). Parking lots have been similarly exempted. See, e.g., Church Divinity School v. County of Alameda, 152 Cal. App. 2d
496, 314 P.2d 209 (1957) (incidental and reasonably necessary standard applied).
."See, e.g., Church Divinity School v. County of Alameda, supra note 16 (student
parking lots and residences occupied by married faculty and students exempted); State
v. Fairview Hosp. Ass'n, 114 N.W.2d 568 (Minn. 1962); Congregation of B'nai Yisroel v.
Township of Millburn, 35 N.J. Super. 67, 113 A.2d 182 (1955) (synagogue parking lot).
"sE.g., State v. Taylor, 262 Ala. 639, 80 So.2d 618 (1955); Gifford Memorial Hosp. v.
Town of Randolph, 119 Vt. 66, 118 A.2d 480 (1955). See 3 Su-nIERLAND, op. cit. supra
note 14, § 6702.
20 See, e.g., Julius Roehrs Co. v. Division of Tax App., 16 N.J. 493, 109 A.2d 611
(1954); Borough of Homestead v. Defense Plant Corp., 356 Pa. 500, 52 A.2d 581 (1947).
Tennessee is a majority rule state requiring strict interpretation. First Nat'l Bank v.
McCanless, 186 Tenn. 1, 2, 207 S.W.2d 1007, 1008-09 (1948); Illinois Cential R. v.
Memphis, 21 Tenn. App. 327, 110 S.W.2d 352 (1937). It has been suggested, however,
that "much of the legal literature relating to tax exemptions stresses, as the most
significant feature of the extensive litigation relating thereto, the dichotomy between
strict and liberal interpretation. The cases themselves, however, strongly suggest that
the specific statutory language in which the exemption is formulated has a far greater
influence upon decision than theoretical doctrines of interpretation." Van Alstyne,
supra note 10, at 504.
In addition, further liberalization has been accomplished by drawing distinctions
between charitable, religious and educational institutions with some given greater
exemption than others. See Salt Lake Lodge v. Groesbeck. 40 Utah 1, 120 Pac. 192
(1911) (educational and charitable).
-"Thus courts have upheld exemption of employee parking lots and cafeterias,
tennis courts, bowling alleys, golf courses, and swimming pools. See, e.g., Cedars of
Lebanon Hosp. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221 P.2d 31 (1950); People
11, 142 N.E. 520 (1924); State v. Fairview Hosp. Ass'n, 114
v. Catholic Bishop, 311 Ill.
N.W.2d 568 (Minn. 1962); Sisters of Mercy v. Town of Hooksett. 93 N.H. 301, 42
A.2d 222 (1945).
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liberal tests by holding such facilities not reasonably necessary for
the enjoyment of the property, or not incidental to the primary use
of the property for charter purposes. 21 Nevertheless, the Nashville
court eschewed such liberalization when it stressed use rather than
ownership, rejected the distinction between primary and incidental
use, and strictly interpreted the statute despite the Tennessee rule
that revenue acts be construed against the taxing authority.=a
Furthermore, the decision suggests that uniform taxation will be
the rule, and that henceforth the taxpayer will have a heavy burden
in proving exemption.
While state courts and legislatures have felt constrained to extend
charitable exemptions because of the strong policy assumed to support them, 24 the commentators have rejected the present validity of
the factors which have supported exemption in the past. 25 The most
frequently cited basis for the exemption, and the most assailed, is.
that exemptions actually decrease taxation because the exempt institution assumes some of the welfare burden that the government
would normally bear. 28 A more basic though less cited reason is
that these exemptions are granted to promote morality thus bene21

E.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 309, 172 A.2d 420,
(1961) (business printing held not incidental to scholastic printery); Second Church of
Christ Scientist v. Philadelphia, 398 Pa. 65, 157 A.2d 54 (1960) (parking lot held not
necessary for church under statute incorporating necessary standard).
2
First Nat'l Bank v. McCanless, 186 Tenn. 1, 2, 207 S.W.2d 1007, 1008-09 (1948);
Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Memphis, 21 Tenn. App. 327, 110 S.W.2d 352 (1936).
23360 S.W.2d at 468.
2
1For general discussions on the policy behind exemptions, including those,
reasons not stated in the text, see Louisville v. Presbyterian Orphan's Home Soc'y, 299,
Ky. 566, 186 S.W.2d 194 (1945); Cleveland Osteopathic Hosp. v. Zangerle, 153 Ohio St.
222, 91 N.E.2d 261 (1950); YMCA v. Philadelphia, 323 Pa. 401, 187 At. 204 (1936);
Holbrook & O'Neill, CaliforniaProperty Tax Trends, 24 So. CAL. L.REV. 252 (1951);"
Killough, Exemptions to Educational, Philanthropic and Religious Organizations,
in TAX POLICY LEAGUE, TAX EXEMPTIONs 23 (1939); Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 288:

(1950); Note, 49 CoLUm. L. Rav. 968 (1949).
25See Holbrook 8. O'Neill, supra note 24; Killough, supra note 24; Stimson, The"
Exemption of Churches From Taxation, 18 TAXES 361 (1940); Note, 64 HARV. L. REv.
288 (1950). Other widely cited reasons for exemption are: exemptions sustain the
impetus for private giving; charitable functions are better and more cheaply performed by private agencies rather than by the state and performance by private
agencies insures freedom from political controls; and in addition, the states would
be unable to perform religious functions. On the other hand reasons against exemption are: the amount of exemption far exceeds the lessening of the tax burden
caused by the charities assuming state burdens; and states are already performing
welfare functions, thus it would be cheaper to concentrate these functions in the state.
26 See Holbrook, Maxwell & Rourke, Fifield Manor Tax Refunds Cases: True
Meaning of "Charity" Under California Welfare Tax Exemption Restated, 35 So. CAL.
L. Rrcv. 276, 281 (1962); Holbrook & O'Neill, supra note 24, at 272; Note, 64 HARy. L.
R.v. 288 (1950).
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Moreover, in the area of religious exemptions it

is argued that to abolish the exemption would be an interference
with the free exercise of religion.2 8 These reasons for exemption
are given less credence in the Nashville opinion than are contemporary policy considerations opposed to exemption. In attacking
the economic basis of exemption, the court indicated that today
government has largely assumed the welfare burdens once borne by
exempt organizations; and that such exempt organizations are actually thwarting these welfare programs to a certain extent by depriving the government of needed revenue.29 In addition, the
court argues that exemptions which were originally granted to aid
struggling charitable institutions, are outdated and that such organizations are abusing their privileged status by actually competing
with private, tax-paying businesses. 30 The court concluded by
stating that such tax inequalities violate fundamental American
concepts of the equality of taxation, which in turn might some day
be responsible for the complete abrogation of the favorable tax status
enjoyed by the now-exempt institutions.31 And in the context of
the separation of church and state, the court pointed out that charitable exemptions are often "poorly concealed forms of tax support
for organized religion." 32 A further argument against the present
status of exemptions is that under the current system of property
taxation, the property-rich and the property-poor are taxed, and
therefore exempted, at the same rates; thus the property-poor charities which might seem to require the most help are not given any
special aid by the exemption policy; and in this respect the policy
of exemption is a failure on its own terms.83
In the Nashville case, the Tennessee court took a significant
step toward limiting charitable exemptions in its determination that
the standard to be used in application of the exemption would be
in keeping with a policy of strictness rather than the usual liberality.
The court, refusing to accept the policy factors assumed to support
27 See Holbrook & O'Neill, supra note 24, at 272; Stimson, supra note 25, at 362-63;
Note, 64 Hmv. L. REV. 288, 289 (1950).
28See Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 CoLum. L.
Rzv. 968 (1949), and cases cited therein at 968 n.2.
21360 S.W.2d at 468-70.
1oSee Note, 64 HAv. L. Rav. 288, 298 (1950).
31360 S.W.2d at 470.
2 Id. at 469.
"1Note, 64 HAsv. L. REv.288, 293 (1950).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1963: 586

liberal exemption, arrived at this determination not through a
normal use of orthodox legal doctrines, 4 but through an examination of policy. Although the court based its decision on current
policy rather than on the policy attendant at the statute's enactment,
and despite the possibility that the judicial test herein enumerated
might be subject to future liberalization, a desirable result was
reached. In the absence of a reflection of these economic necessities
in new legislation tightening and reshaping the charitable exemption, a court sensitive to the wants of its jurisdiction is powerless
to do more than recognize current policy and adapt its statutory
construction to such policy whenever possible. Such a policy
orientated analysis indicates the need for legislative re-examination
of the charitable exemption in view of current economic realities.
3
1For another case rejecting such liberalizing distinctions see Cleveland Osteopathic
Hosp. v. Zangerle, 153 Ohio St. 222, 225-26, 91 N.E.2d 261, 263 (1950), wherein the court
said: "It seems obvious that no single test is dispositive of whether a hospital, for
example, is being conducted exclusively as a charitable project. All the facts in each
individual case must be assembled and examined in their entirety and the substance of
the scheme or plan of operation exhibited thereby will determine whether the institution involved is entitled to have its property freed from taxes."

